This paper highlights the most important institutional evolutions of Belgian federalism stemming from the implementation of the sixth state reform (2012)(2013)(2014). This reform inter alia included a transfer of powers worth 20 billion euros from the federal level to the level of the federated states, a profound reform of the Senate, and a substantial increase in fiscal autonomy for the regions. This contribution critically analyses the current state of Belgian federalism. Although the sixth state reform realized important and long-awaited changes, further evolutions are to be expected. Since the Belgian state model has reached its limits with regard to complexity and creativity, politicians and academics should begin to reflect on the seventh state reform with the aim of increasing the transparency of the current Belgian institutional labyrinth.
Introduction
After In 2011, the list of constitutional provisions which were designated to be susceptible to revision did not contain all articles required for the implementation of the agreement on the sixth state reform. However, after a regime crisis of 541 days politicians wanted to avoid the organization of new elections. As a result, the negotiators of the sixth state reform used their legal toolbox in order to implement the entire agreement without the approval of a new revision statement and without new elections. The list included article 195 of the Constitution, namely the constitutional amendment procedure itself.
Consequently, the negotiators decided to add a 'transitional provision' to article 195, which was only valid during the same legislative term and gave authority to immediately revise the necessary constitutional provisions. From a strictly legal perspective, one could argue that a two-thirds majority was permitted to amend article 195 in this way, even though the constitutional amendment procedure and its guarantees were in practice temporarily set aside.
The transitional provision contained an exhaustive list of constitutional provisions susceptible to immediate revision. An amendment could only be adopted with a two-thirds majority as required by article 195 and was not seen as a revision statement leading to dissolution of Parliament.
Guarantees of article 195
It has already been argued on a regular basis that the amendment procedure in article 195 of the Constitution is too rigid (Van Nieuwenhove 2012: 156) . Legal scholars have questioned whether the aims of this procedure outweigh its adverse effects.
In theory, the Constituent Assembly aimed to ensure that the voters could express their opinion in an election about the constitutional provisions susceptible to revision. In practice, however, Parliament uses, or indeed abuses, the approval of a revision statement as the standard procedure to rescind parliament and hold new elections. Afterwards, the election campaign is often dominated by general policy issues instead of a thorough debate about the revision statement.
It was the intention of article 195 to avoid a rash approval of constitutional amendments, as the Constitution guarantees the fundamental basic principles which are essential to the rule of law. Consequently, it should not be possible to amend a constitution through the regular legislative procedure. A more rigid procedure ought to safeguard the fundamental character of the Constitution, which is obviously more than 'a scrap of paper'.
II

Criticism
The opposition parties heavily criticized the 'trick' with article 195 of the Constitution described above, as it dodged the guarantees of the amendment procedure. The Flemish right-wing nationalist party (N-VA) inter alia referred to article 187 of the Constitution, which forbids a partial or entire suspension of the Constitution. They argued that the transitional provision did not regulate the transition from an old to a new arrangement, but in fact constituted a temporary suspension of the Constitution (Vandernoot 2013). From the beginning of the consecutive legislative term, the ordinary amendment procedure would, once more, become the applicable law. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that N-VA itself, when the party was still involved in the negotiations, also launched several proposals which required the amendment of articles over and above those susceptible to revision. It seems highly unlikely that N-VA would have proposed to wait another legislative term rather than take advantage of some constitutional high-tech; the duty of the opposition is, of course, to oppose.
Moreover, N-VA petitioned the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe to scrutinize the temporary revision of article 195 of the Constitution. III The Commission argued that the amendment procedure ought to safeguard some important guarantees, but at the same time stated that in practice these aims have not always been fully accomplished.
As a result, the Venice Commission refuted the arguments of the opposition regarding the guarantees of article 195. Furthermore, the Commission decided that article 195 of the Constitution had not been suspended though indeed it had been altered. On 20 June 2012, the Venice Commission thus ruled that the 'transitional provision' neither violated the letter and the spirit of the Constitution nor international norms and standards. 
Towards a reform of article 195?
Although the Venice Commission ruled that the transitional provision was not unconstitutional, the 'trick' can still be criticised. Indeed, the adoption of the 'transitional provision' could be used as a precedent, so that in the future only one article, namely article 195 of the Constitution, might be declared susceptible to amendment. Such an evolution would of course blatantly undermine the guarantees provided by article 195.
The initiation of a debate about a sustainable reform of article 195 is recommendable, as the efficacy of the current procedural guarantees is highly questionable. We believe that it is time to thoroughly modernise the constitutional amendment procedure, and adapt it to the current federal cooperation model, instead of relying on the 'trick' with article 195 for possible future state reform. Some politicians are reluctant to discuss such reforms, as they fear that a simplification of the amendment procedure would make further devolution to the regions and communities easier and would thus contribute to the dismantlement of the federal level.
Despite an explicit demand of N-VA, in view of facilitating its institutional reformist agenda after the next election, the intention to include article 195 in the revision statement at the end of the current legislative term has not been mentioned in the coalition agreement of the new government of Prime Minister Michel. Undoubtedly, this important debate will be revived at the end of the current legislative session.
The split of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde
The electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) dates back to 1830, the year in which Belgium became independent. Ever since the state reforms after 1970 which gave rise to the regions and communities, the electoral district BHV has been a constant source of friction in Belgian politics. 
Special dispute settlement in the suburban municipalities of Brussels
Disputes between the communities, mostly concerning the correct interpretation of the Belgian language legislation, regularly arise in the six municipalities with facilities in the suburban area of Brussels. Consequently, the sixth state reform provided a legal solution to address these problems. From now on, all administrative disputes originating in these six has to be renewed every four years.
Reform of the BHV judicial district
The agreement on the sixth state reform not only included the split of the BHV electoral district and the special regime for the municipalities with facilities, but also provided a reform of the BHV judicial district (Gosselin 2013). This judicial district was difficult to manage due to its complex structure. The Act of 19 July 2012 on the reform of the judicial district of Brussels implemented a thorough reform. The Act split the former prosecutor's office into a prosecutor's office of Halle-Vilvoorde and a prosecutor's office of Brussels. As a result, the prosecutor's offices are able to decide on their own policy, taking into account the specific criminal activities most frequently occurring in their district. However, the courts themselves were not territorially divided. They are duplicated based on language; every court is now divided into two monolingual sections.
Consequently, there is no real split of the BHV judicial district (Vandenbruwaene 2014: 207; Vanlerberghe 2014: 202) . With some minor exceptions, this Act has recently passed constitutional review.
VIII
Generally, we can conclude that the negotiations on the split of Brussels-HalleVilvoorde were conducted in a typical Belgian way. In order to reach an agreement on the sixth state reform, both Flemings and Walloons made concessions. As BHV afflicted Belgium for almost fifty years and led to an institutional crisis, it is important that an agreement has finally been reached.
Reform of the Senate
The Belgian Senate looks completely different after the sixth state reform. A thorough reform of the bicameral system has been implemented, whereby the composition and legislative powers of the Senate were revised. From now on, the Senate is an assembly primarily representing the interests of the federated entities on the federal level, which fills a gap in the Belgian federal state structure. It is appropriate in a federal state that the federated entities have a say in (federal) matters which concern them (Goossens and Cannoot 2013: 6). Representation of the interests of federated entities principally -though not always -takes place within a second federal chamber (Popelier 2014: 57). Patricia
Popelier theoretically distinguishes four sets of powers that can be distributed to the second chamber: (1) powers that directly relate to the federal state structure and functioning of the federated entities, (2) powers that influence the policy discretion of the federated entities, such as concurring powers, (3) powers that indirectly influence the discretion of the federated entities and (4) powers that do not relate to the federated entities (Popelier 2014: 59) . Moreover, it is only if a second chamber is composed of a delegation from the Parliaments of the federated entities, that it should be expected to play a significant parliamentary role at the federal level (Popelier 2014: 58) . After the reform, it is now up to the Senate to fulfil its new role as chamber of the federated entities.
New composition
The The other ten senators are 'co-opted senators'. The technique of co-optation was initially introduced to involve experts (technocrats) in the parliamentary work of the Senate. They were presumed to improve the quality of the debate and the legislation.
Unfortunately, nowadays this category of senators is primarily used to provide a seat for politicians who could not be directly elected. Parliament preserved co-optation in the sixth state reform as a compensation for the split of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde electoral district in order to ensure that (Flemish) Brussels politicians could still become members of the Senate.
Maintaining the technique of co-optation is a stain on the character of the reform (Muylle 2014: 114) . The distribution of the ten seats is based on the election results of the Chamber of Representatives, which is inconsistent with the idea of the Senate as a chamber of the federated entities. Given the considerable reduction of legislative powers of the Senate, it would have been more rational to have given these co-opted politicians a seat in the Chamber instead. Either way, we believe that co-optation should be abolished since non-elected technocrats already work in the cabinets and as parliamentary staff members.
Moreover, if experts want to become a Member of Parliament, they should participate in the elections.
Vast reduction of powers
The sixth state reform curtailed the powers of the Senate and transformed the institution into a non-permanent body which now holds a plenary meeting eight times per year. The unicameral procedure, in which the legislative power is vested in the Chamber of Representatives and the King without involvement of the Senate, became the standard legislative procedure. The unicameral procedure applies to all matters for which the optional or full bicameral procedure has not explicitly been prescribed by the Constitution.
As a compensation, a second reading has been introduced in the Chamber of Representatives. As a result, the Senate will have substantially less legislative work.
The remaining powers of the Senate mainly relate to institutional matters: the revision and coordination of the Constitution, the adoption of special majority acts, and ordinary acts with an institutional character. The Senate no longer participates in the everyday management of the country, but through the Senate the federated entities now have full co-decision power and thus potentially veto power regarding institutional matters.
However, it is doubtful whether the Senate will be able to adequately act as a fullfledged chamber of the federated entities, since the scope of its powers is very limited. In contrast to the German Bundesrat, the Belgian second chamber has limited power to 
Senate: quo vadis?
The shortcomings of the Senate reform can be attributed to the absence of a clear vision regarding the future, and the appropriate role, of the Senate (Van der Besien 2014).
For instance, most Flemish political parties preferred the abolition of the institution and thus were in favour of the end of bicameralism. Ultimately, the Senate's role could easily be taken over by a special institutional committee within the Chamber of Representatives.
Moreover, the interests of the communities and regions are already protected by several other instruments: the presence of language groups in the Chamber of Representatives, the language parity of the federal government, and suspension mechanisms such as the alarm bell procedure and the procedure for conflicts of interest (Popelier 2014). On the other hand, some people advocate the idea of a more influential Senate with full legislative powers for the federated entities at the federal level.
We believe that a well-functioning Senate could be of great value in a federal state. One could opt for a full-fledged chamber of the federated entities, and increase its legislative powers to become similar to those of the German Bundesrat. 
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For now, however, Belgium has an institution whose current value and role are not clear. It is up to the politicians to make a deliberate choice. They should either abolish the Senate and leave its tasks to the Chamber of Representatives, or ensure that the Senate actively resolves tensions between the communities and regions and prepares future institutional steps.
Reform of the Special Finance Act and fiscal autonomy for the regions
The institutional agreement on the sixth state reform announced a substantial reform regarding the financing of the federated entities. The Special Finance Act of 6 January 2014
substantially expanded the fiscal autonomy of the regions. We will now outline the main principles of the reform. 
Regional fiscal autonomy
Regional fiscal autonomy in the sixth state reform is expanded by the power for the 
Financing of communal powers
The powers transferred to the communities in the sixth state reform (e.g. family benefits, care for the elderly, and healthcare) are financed by new dotations. In contrast to the regions, the communities have not acquired any fiscal autonomy, because this might cause problems with regard to the territorial division of powers and the principle of equality in Brussels, as both the Flemish and the French Community are competent on the territory of Brussels. Giving fiscal autonomy to the communities could lead to the establishment of sub-nationalities and an unjustified differential treatment of neighbours in Brussels who might be subjected to different tax rules. As a result, the communities still mainly receive their income from allocated parts (dotations) of the revenue of federal personal income tax and value-added tax.
New solidarity mechanism
Before the sixth state reform, the national solidarity compensation could result in socalled 'perverse effects', such as the 'development trap'. In the latter case a region would receive less dotations in spite of increased tax profit due to economic growth in the region.
The sixth state reform has maintained a national solidarity mechanism, but in a more limited way and without perverse effects.
Temporary transitional mechanism
As Wallonia would most likely receive less income in the case of increased regional fiscal autonomy, a (temporary) transitional mechanism was proposed in order to seal the deal during the negotiations on the sixth state reform (Pagano 2013). It was agreed that a region or community could neither be structurally impoverished, nor financially gain or lose in the first year that the reform of the Special Finance Act enters into force (Goossens and Van Belle 2014: 1). As from budget year 2015, a transitional amount will be provided for the communities and regions in order to offset the impact of the reform. This amount remains the same in nominal value during the first ten years. During the subsequent ten years, it will decrease linearly (with a gradual decrease of 10% per year) until it has completely vanished. Hence, Wallonia has been given the time to economically strengthen itself and to increase its income tax revenue.
'Proper funding' of Brussels
The sixth state reform also provides 'proper funding' of the Belgian capital city (Yernault 2013). There are several reasons why Brussels needs additional funding. Firstly, fiscal autonomy concerning personal income tax as an accountability mechanism is not effective for Brussels. The wages of many employees cannot be subjected to taxation in Brussels, as many of them are commuters who live in other regions. Secondly, Brussels loses significant tax revenue due to the presence of many international and national public institutions which enjoy exemption from property taxation. Finally, the status of Brussels as capital city and headquarters of numerous international institutions entails additional tasks and costs.
Therefore, the additional funding for Brussels will be 461 million EUR by 2015 (Goossens and Van Belle 2012: 1205) . One part of this funding is allocated to a specific purpose, for the additional burdens that Brussels bears in comparison to other regions with regard to bilingualism, mobility, training and safety. The other part of the financing is called the 'dead hand' compensation, and is a compensation for the loss of revenue due to the exemption from property tax of numerous buildings. In addition, a structural refinancing is provided for commuters (financed by the other two regions) and international officials (financed by the federal government). After 2015, the additional 'proper funding' of the Brussels-Capital Region will be limited to maximum 0.1% of the GDP.
Climate accountability and contribution to public expenses
The reform of the Special Finance Act also introduced a climate accountability mechanism for the regions and communities. If a region or community exceeds, or fails to reach, the targets on greenhouse gas emission reduction as defined by the National Climate 
Transfer of powers in the sixth state reform: Copernican revolution?
Since 1970, the Belgian Constitution has mentioned the existence of communities and regions. The establishment of these unique federated entities has particular historical origins. Flemish politicians wanted to establish communities to acquire cultural autonomy and protect their language and culture. Walloon, mainly left-wing, politicians on the other hand, pursued economic autonomy via the establishment of regions.
Over time, the communities have acquired legislative powers concerning so-called 'person-related' matters, such as education, culture and assistance to persons. Economic and 'place-related matters', such as spatial planning, public works and agriculture, were transferred to the regions. Other federal countries, such as Germany, Switzerland and the U.S., only have one type of federated state, respectively Länder, cantons and states, based on territory alone. Thus, the unique division of the federated level in Belgium into communities and regions is remarkable and complex.
Extensive transfer of powers
In light of the historical evolution of Belgian federalism, the sixth state reform is Thus, the sixth state reform undoubtedly adds additional complexity to the Belgian institutional structure and distribution of powers. We believe that it is, therefore, time to question the distinction between communities and regions. A new state structure based on one type of federated state, organised on territorial lines as federal countries like Germany, Switzerland and the U.S., would substantially contribute to a simplification of the labyrinthine Belgian state.
The future of Brussels after the sixth state reform
The Brussels-Capital Region acquired many new powers in the sixth state reform.
Although Flemish politicians repeatedly suggested the combination of a transfer of powers and additional financial means for this region with an internal institutional reform, a simplification has (again) not been achieved. Brussels remains a tangle of institutions, so that a thorough structural reform is still urgent.
The Brussels Region-Community
Former Flemish Minister-President, Kris Peeters, stated on several occasions that Brussels would never be a full-fledged region, thereby reflecting the vision of several Flemish political parties. XII However, legally, this statement does not make sense. In fact,
Brussels is a full-fledged region and in the sixth state reform it acquired even more powers than the other regions. One could now call Brussels a 'super-region' or 'region-community' (Velaers 2014b: 1023).
As mentioned above, the person-related powers regarding juvenile criminal law and family allowances were transferred to the communities, though in Brussels these passed to the Common Community Commission which is composed of members of the BrusselsCapital regional parliament (Pas 2014: 346) . This transfer marked the first time in Belgian institutional history that community powers were allocated to the Brussels-Capital Region.
This transfer of powers is remarkable, as the bilingual character of Brussels and the lack of an own autonomous culture are traditionally invoked as arguments against granting community powers to Brussels.
The latter view, which predominated during previous state reforms, has been replaced by a more pragmatic manner of thinking. Although Brussels still caused deep discussions during the sixth state reform negotiations, the attention has shifted towards defending the interests of the region's inhabitants, rather than to traditional institutional antagonisms (Velaers 2014b (Velaers : 1023 . Moreover, the transfer of powers regarding juvenile criminal law and family allowances to the Common Community Commission was considered to be a constitutional necessity. The existence of different family allowance and juvenile criminal law regimes of the French and Flemish Community on the Brussels territory could have led to the establishment of sub-nationalities and a differential treatment, which might be incompatible with the constitutional principle of equality (Dumont and Van Drooghenbroeck 2011).
Towards a simplification of the Brussels labyrinth?
During the negotiations on the sixth state reform, a simplification of the labyrinthine structure of Brussels institutions was proposed. However, the patchwork of municipal, communal and regional institutions has, regrettably, remained intact. subject of many compromises, so that the structure of Brussels became very complex. The current complex structure originates from the different interests of the federal level, the Flemish and French Communities, the Brussels-Capital Region and the European Union, which each influences Brussels politics. One cannot ignore the special position of Brussels in Belgian federalism as capital of the country, which brings about specific challenges (Velaers 2014b: 985) . In addition, 28% of the population in Brussels does not have the Belgian nationality, which gives rise to challenges with regard to multiculturalism. Brussels is also de facto the capital of the EU and has a strong international character, causing the need for a customized approach.
In conclusion, a simplification of the existing patchwork of Brussels institutions is urgent (Velaers 2014b: 1024). As Brussels faces many socioeconomic challenges due to its status of bilingual and multicultural capital, it is questionable whether it is possible to deal with these challenges without providing a solid solution for the institutional problems. In this regard, it could be necessary for the communities to decrease their influence in Brussels in order to enable a simplification of the institutions and the distribution of powers.
'Frenchification' of Brussels
Due to the Frenchification starting at the end of the 18th century, there is in practice no real bilingualism in Brussels. In the legal sense the Belgian capital is bilingual, but
French has gradually taken the upper hand. Consequently, as part of the deal on the reform of the Brussels judicial district, the Butterfly Agreement, for instance, stipulated that the public prosecutor of the Brussels Public Prosecution Service needed to be French-speaking.
However, the Constitutional Court recently annulled this provision. XIII Nevertheless, the annulled provision is a clear indicator of the mind-set resulting from the substantial Frenchification, which is strikingly illustrated by the final report of the Taskforce Brussels in 2012. XIV The number of Brussels inhabitants whose spoken French is classed as 'well' to 'excellent', remains stable at 95.5%. In contrast, the Dutch-speaking group is limited to 28.2%. Moreover, only 17.2% of the French-speaking Brussels inhabitants speak Dutch to their Dutch-speaking friends.
The gap between legal bilingualism and the actual dominance of French is substantial.
In fact, the fear of some Flemish inhabitants of Brussels that the influence of the Flemish Community and the use of Dutch will diminish, is justified. The reason why Brussels is still officially bilingual only has historical and political reasons: for centuries, Brussels used to be a Dutch-speaking town and the city still remains the capital of the Flemish Community.
The question rises whether the Flemish-speaking inhabitants of Brussels believe that the ties with the Flemish Community are still desirable and necessary, because Brussels' citizens seem to be increasingly convinced that they form a group which should govern Brussels without interference from the French and Flemish Communities. Cutting the ties between Brussels and the communities thus gradually seems to be entering the Brussels mind-set (Vuye 2012: 246-247) . In order to fulfil the increased desire for self-governance in Brussels, a new state structure has been advocated in legal doctrine (Vande Lanotte 2011).
In conclusion, the initial intentions of the sixth state reform regarding a simplification of the Brussels patchwork were laudable, but the execution should have been better and more transparent. Therefore, Brussels will also in the future remain the constitutional laboratory of Belgium.
The future of Belgian federalism
It should be apparent to the reader by now that Belgium has not yet reached the final stage of its institutional evolution. The implementation of the sixth state reform may therefore be seen as the first step towards the seventh reform of Belgian federalism. The strong Flemish nationalistic movement, the desire for self-governance in Brussels, and the inefficiency of the current federal structure will in all likelihood eventually lead to a seventh state reform with new power transfers to the federated entities (Velaers 2013: 571).
However, it is doubtful whether this new state reform will be realised in the next few years.
A recent survey (2014) shows a decline of 15.6% in the desire of Flemish voters to grant more powers to the federated entities, in comparison to the situation before the sixth state reform. The survey shows that currently the majority of Flemings (57.5%) are in favour of either the current state structure (32.8%) or more powers to the federal level (13.2%) or even a unitary state (11.2%). The same survey also indicates that employment (43%), healthcare (36.9%) and pensions (32.4%) were regarded to be the crucial themes for the voters in the 2014 federal elections. Hence, the main focus of the election was not inspired by the need for institutional reform.
The power transfers of the sixth state reform have resulted in a paradigm shift, since the lion's share of powers -excluding social security -is now situated at the level of the federated states. The sixth state reform also thoroughly revised the Special Finance Act, which considerably increased the fiscal autonomy of the regions. Nevertheless, large fixed dotations are still allocated to the communities and regions. Undoubtedly, calls for further raising the level of fiscal autonomy and accountability of the federated entities will be put on the table in the future.
Towards a Belgian Union with three or four states?
The we believe that it would be advisable to submit such a significant constitutional reform to the voters for the sake of democratic legitimacy.
Nevertheless, critics of this vision of a Belgian Union with federated states have argued that Brussels would not be able to function without the funding of the other states (Vuye 2012: 252) . This is far from being true, as Brussels has a lot of corporation seats. Thus, a decentralisation of corporate taxation would immediately solve the financial problems of Brussels. Moreover, the proximity of Brussels Airport is a huge motor for both local economy and employment.
According to Hendrik Vuye, N-VA fraction leader in the Chamber of Representatives, and constitutional expert, the key word for the further evolution of Brussels -and Belgium in general -is 'asymmetry' (Vuye 2012: 259). According to Vuye, the Walloon and Flemish visions of Brussels do not have to be the same. On the contrary, it will only be when the two communities can constitutionally realize their different visions that Brussels will be able to flourish. In Vuye's vision, Flanders can maintain its institutional connection to Brussels, whilst the French-speakers can develop the French Community Commission (COCOF) into a full-fledged community.
Towards a crucial role for the reformed Senate or its abolition?
The reformed Senate could play a crucial role in a seventh reform of the Belgian state.
As described above, the Senate is now a full-fledged chamber of the federated entities, mainly competent for institutional matters. We believe that the senators should be proactive in preparing for future steps in the institutional reform of Belgium by gathering information through expert hearings and debates. The Senate should thus act similarly to the Convention on the Future of Europe, which drafted the notorious EU Constitutional
Treaty. It is clear that the current legislative term will be decisive for the role and the future existence of the Senate. If the chamber does not act as a useful platform of (institutional) communication between the regions and communities, it would be better that the Senate be dissolved, and that its function should be integrated within the Chamber of Representatives.
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